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Alexander: Johnson v. Johnson
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21,

clear case of judicial legislation. This step the court would be understandably loath to take."
Under the present state of Montana law a lawyer's decision whether
or not to appeal from an equity decree is at best a guess as to which standard the court will apply. In view of the complex mass of cases on the
subject and the awkward legislation now in effect it would seem that well
planned legislative action would bring the best solution to the problem. A
well defined rule on scope of review is badly needed; it is an everyday
working tool of an appellate court.
DOUGLAS C. ALLEN

DIVORCE-ADJUDICATION

OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DIVORCE ACTION.

The

plaintiff husband filed a complaint for divorce on grounds of desertion.
Defendant in her answer denied the alleged desertion, asked for a decree of
separate maintenance, and further alleged that she had, during the marriage, contributed to the plaintiff approximately $3,000.00 for the purchase
and maintenance of real and personal property, which is now owned solely
by the plaintiff. The court found the wife guilty of desertion and granted
the divorce to the husband. The court further found that the wife, by reason of the money she had contributed to the purchase and maintenance of
plaintiff's property, was equitably entitled to $1,600.00, to be paid out of
plaintiff's sole property. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the
judgment requiring him to pay this amount to the defendant. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, affirmed. A divorce court, although without specific statutory authority, has the equitable power to
adjudicate the property rights of the parties to a divorce action. Johnson
v. Johnson, 349 P.2d 310 (Mont. 1960) (Justices Harrison and Castles dissenting).
By the decision in the instant case the Montana Supreme Court has
apparently overruled a long line of cases which have consistently held that
the divorce court has no power to adjudicate the property rights of the
parties to a divorce action.'
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 21-139 states in part: "Where
a divorce is granted for an offense of the husband, the court may compel
him to... make such suitable allowance to the wife for her support during
her life or for a shorter period as the court may deem just."
This statute provides for the payment of alimony, but is expressly lim"Subsequent to the instant case, however, the Montana court has again used the sub-

stantial evidence test in an equity appeal. Roth v. Palutzke, 350 P.2d 358 (Mont.
1960).
'Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593, 208 P.2d 514 (1949) ; Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont.
201, 200 P.2d 251 (1948) ; Rufenach v. Rufenach, 120 Mont. 351, 185 P.2d 293
(1947) ; Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381, 3 P.2d 402 (1931) ; Albrecht v. Albrecht, 83
Mont. 37, 269 Pac. 158 (1928) ; Damm v. Damm, 82 Mont. 239, 266 Pac. 410 (1928) ;
Bischoff v. Bischoff, 70 Mont. 503, 226 Pac. 508 (1924) ; Thrift v. Thrift, 54 Mont.
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ited to cases where the divorce is granted for an offense of the husband.
Neither this statute, nor any other, authorizes a court to grant alimony in
a case where the wife is the one at fault. The majority opinion correctly
states that the above statute is not involved in this case for the further reason that the award to the wife is a property settlement, not alimony.
Strictly speaking, alimony is a continuing allowance given to the wife (and
in some states to the husband) for her support. A property settlement, on
the other hand, is a permanent division of the property of the parties.
Whereas alimony will continue only so long as the wife is living or remains
unmarried, a property settlement is a final determination of the rights of
the parties and is not dependent upon remarriage or death of one of the
parties.'
The court in the instant case takes the position that the wife is only
regaining her rightful share of property held in her husband's name. The
majority opinion then goes on to state: "[Though the point is not directly involved here, the writer thinks that the case of Rufenach v. Rufenach, 120 Mont. 351, 185 P.2d 293, supra, and others holding that a divorce
court cannot adjust property rights are erroneous and should be overruled. ' (Emphasis added.) Despite the disclaimer, the question of the
court's power to adjust property rights in a divorce action remains the
crux of the decision. As is stated in the dissenting opinion, "it is but a
fiction to say that the court is not actually divesting the husband of
property and transferring it to the wife, but is actually giving the wife
that which is already hers."'
The rule of the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions is
that the power of a court in a divorce action is strictly statutory.! There
was no common law divorce." These courts state that the power of a divorce
court to award alimony and to adjudicate property rights must come from
the statutes. The California Court, under an alimony statute similar to
ours,' has said that the divorce court's jurisdiction does not extend to the
separate property of either party.'
In many jurisdictions there is specific statutory authority to adjudicate property rights between the parties to a divorce.' Under these statutes
the courts are generally given broad equitable powers to divide the property in a just manner regardless which party obtains the divorce.
Cases where a divorce court has been given power to adjudicate property rights without specific statutory authority have been found hereto'"Alimony is in no way a property settlement, but is the provision for the support of
the wife." Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 501, 167 P.2d 848, 855 (1946).
aInstant case at 312.
'Id. at 313.
'Ecker v. Ecker, 22 Okla. 873, 98 Pac. 918 (1908); Bernard, v. Bernard, 74 S.D. 449,
54 N.W.2d 351 (1952). See 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 291 n.91 (1959) for annotation
of cases supporting this rule.
2 NEisoN, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 14.11 (2d ed. 1945).
'CAL. Crv. Cora § 139.
'Snyder v. Snyder, 134 Cal. App. 2d 445, 286 P.2d 362 (1955).
'E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-1511 (1949) ; S. D. CODE § 14.0726 (1939) ; CoLO. RV.
STAT. ch. 46-15 (1953).
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In the Florida case of Eakin v. Eakie the court

stated :'

Under some circumstances it is within the power of the trial court
to make an award to the wife of certain specific property. Such
an award may be made when it is shown to be warranted by facts
and circumstances sufficient to support a finding of equity in the
property in favor of the wife arising from the contributions of
funds or services made toward its accumulation above and beyond
the performance of ordinary marital duties.
In Williams v. Williams' the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that a divorce court has an inherent power to give the wife equitable relief to protect her interest in property acquired through the joint efforts of the
spouses.'
Prior to the instant case, the Montana court had consistently held
that a divorce court has only statutory jurisdiction.' In Shaw v. Shaw"
the court would not allow an involuntary property settlement to be made
and stated:
Montana has no community property law and the statutes of this
state have conferred no power upon the court in an action for divorce to divest the title of the husband to specific real or personal
property or to adjudge or order an involuntary assignment or
transfer thereof to the wife. .

.

. The power of courts in divorce

actions is to be determined entirely upon the terms of the statutes
conferring jurisdiction.
The court's present position is that "once equity takes jurisdiction of
a controversy it will grant complete relief."' In abandoning the doctrine
of statutory limitation and in its place recognizing equitable powers to
settle property rights, it would seem that the court has made the correct
choice. By the exercise of its full equitable powers, the divorce court can
now adjust all property rights of thc parties in one suit, and the need for a
subsequent, and perhaps inadequate, action to enforce any property rights
arising during the marriage is thereby eliminated. The divorce court may
more readily recognize a wife's informal contributions1 to the family's assets held in the husband's name, and fully compensate her therefore.
If the instant case is followed, the mere fault of either spouse will not
preclude a property settlement in his or her favor. Whether the court will
limit property adjudications in divorce actions to situations where a spouse
has contributed financially to the property of the other spouse, or whether
it will extend to contributions of labor,' will have to be determined in future cases.
J. A. ALEXANDER
"C9 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1958).
"Accord, Wood v. Wood, 104 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1958) ; Buckalew v. Buckalew, 115 So.
2d 564 (Fla. 1959).
'2186 Ark. 160, 52 S.W.2d 971 (1932).
"Accorn, Taylor v. Taylor, 224 Ark. 328, 273 S.W.2d 22 (1954) ; Stephens v. Stephens,
226 Ark. 219, 288 S.W.2d 957 (1956).
"See cases cited note 1 supra.
"-122 Mont. 593, 612, 208 P.2d 514, 524 (1949).
"Instant case at 312.
"E.g., a wife's labor in a store or on a farm owned by the husband.
19Which is apparently the situation in Arkansas. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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